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This paper uses a data-driven approach to identify the psychological factors that underlie the 
array of strategies that people use to hide their deceit. Two hundred and nine participants 
told two lies and two truths and then completed a self-report scale that elicited their 
experiences when deceiving. A factor analysis of responses produced four factors, three of 
which were strategic in nature: Nonverbal behavior control, which relates to attempts to 
monitor and control nonverbal behavior when lying; Detail, which relates to attempts to 
produce detailed, engaging lies; Cognitive difficulty, which relates to the cognitive 
difficulties experienced when lying and their strategic consequences; and Anxiety, which 
relates to the negative emotions experienced when deceiving. The results further our 
understanding of the psychological processes that underpin deception and suggest several 
potentially fruitful avenues for future research. 
 
 









































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   2 
A Psychometric Investigation into the Structure of Deception Strategy Use. 
In order to improve our ability to detect deception, there is a need to gain a better 
understanding of valid deception cues and their origins. An important part of recent attempts 
to understand the origins of cues to deception is the study of deception strategies. It has long 
been thought that cues to deception can emerge from liars’ strategic attempts to appear honest 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Knapp et al., 1974; Mehrabian, 1971; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; 
2007; Zuckerman et al., 1981). For example, Vrij et al. (1996) found that participants’ self-
reports of the extent to which they strategically controlled their behavior when lying were 
associated with a measured decrease in their subtle movements during deception. Improving 
our understanding of deception strategies is thus a promising avenue for better understanding 
deception cues and, by extension, improving accuracy in deception detection (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008). 
Deception strategies have been central to deception theory since the beginning of 
modern deception research. One of the earliest descriptions of behavior control strategies and 
their impact on cues to deception was put forward by Ekman and Friesen (1969). When 
outlining their theory, Ekman and Friesen made a distinction between ‘inhibition’ and 
‘simulation’ strategies. Inhibition refers to attempts by the deceiver to omit information from 
their deceptive message to avoid ‘leakage’ of information that they want to keep hidden. In 
contrast, simulation refers to attempts to generate the deceptive content of messages to create 
an impression of truthfulness. This can be as simple as filling the holes in a deceptive 
message left by an inhibition strategy or as complicated as creating and maintaining complex 
deceptive behavior, simulating the emotions and generating the verbal content that the liar 
believes approximates the behavior of a truthteller. 
Knapp et al. (1974) mirrored Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) two-factor model of 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   3 
manifest in behavior. In particular, they hypothesised that, in an attempt to appear honest by 
adopting behaviors that they assume are associated with truthfulness, liars might overshoot 
the mark and produce a set of exaggerated behaviors which represent a caricature of a truthful 
pattern of behavior. For example, compensating for fears that they might reduce eye contact 
when lying, liars might make even more eye contact than might somebody who was telling 
the truth. This category of deception cues maps well onto those that Ekman and Friesen 
predict would result from the adoption of a simulation strategy. 
In the modern literature, the possibility that liars adopt simulation strategies is usually 
at best given only brief acknowledgement. Deception strategies are instead mainly equated 
with attempts to reduce behavior so as to inhibit the production of cues to deception (e.g. 
Burgoon & Buller, 1994; DePaulo et al, 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; 2007; Vrij, 2010; 
Vrij et al., 1996). This is perhaps because deception strategies are usually inferred from 
behavior, and several influential meta-analyses of deception cues revealed mainly decreases 
rather than increases in behavior when lying, providing evidence for ‘inhibition’ strategies 
rather than simulation strategies (DePaulo et al, 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). 
Little direct measurement of strategies took place until relatively recently, when a 
significant amount of research effort investigated self-reported deception strategies. Recent, 
data-driven research on self-reported deception strategies typically involves participants 
taking part in a deception task before describing, in response to an open-ended question, the 
strategies they employed when lying. These self-reported strategies are then content analysed 
into superordinate categories representing conceptually related clusters of strategies. The 
strategies identified by this approach are numerous and diverse, reflecting the many ways 
people control their verbal content and nonverbal behavior. Colwell et al. (2006) produced a 
list of 14 categories into which participants’ self-reported deception strategies were placed by 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   4 
Other have reported strategies such as remaining calm, avoiding incriminating details, 
appearing pleasant (Hartwig et al., 2007), maintaining eye contact, avoiding hesitations 
(Strömwall et al., 2006), telling an uncomplicated story (Masip, 2013) providing rich details, 
laughing and joking, behaving consistently between truths and lies, and believing one's own 
lies (Strömwall & Willen, 2011). 
It remains unclear, however, how these myriad strategies are related to one another. 
Most research simply categorizes participants’ self-reported strategies via conceptual 
similarity (as judged by research volunteers), rather than by investigating how they actually 
co-vary with one another. Consequently, these categories may not reflect the true nature of 
the interrelationships among strategies as they occur when a person is lying. The exact nature 
of these strategies, the constellations they form with other strategies, and the psychological 
factors that underpin them have yet to be established. 
As well as improving our understanding of the interrelationships among strategies, the 
present research also addresses another obstacle to deception detection success: individual 
differences in behavior when deceiving. One of the reasons why deception cues are generally 
weak and inconsistent is because different people lie in different ways (Vrij, 2010). For 
example, in a reanalysis of data from three studies on hand movements in deception, Vrij et 
al. (1997) reported that whereas 52% of participants decreased hand movements when lying, 
48% of participants either increased their hand movements or demonstrated no difference in 
the number of hand movements between truths and lies. If deception detection proceeds on 
the basis of general rules, such as that deception is generally associated with a decrease in 
body movement, then such inter-individual variation in behavioral cues necessarily has a 
negative impact on deception detection accuracy. However, if individual differences are 
taken into account - that is, if the variation in cues to deception between liars is understood 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   5 
should improve. Previous attempts to understand individual differences in cues to deception 
have produced mixed results (Vrij, 2010). Deception strategies represent a potentially 
important source of individual differences in cues to deception. Understanding the structure 
of individual differences in strategy use is an important step towards a better understanding of 
individual differences in cues to deception and, by extension, higher levels of accuracy when 
judging veracity. 
The present research examines the structure of self-reported deception strategies. It 
does so by generating a questionnaire-based measure from free reports of deception 
phenomenology, and by using this measure to collect data on what liars’ experience when 
they lie. These data are then subjected to a factor analysis to identify the latent constructs 
underpinning these experiences. This approach extends the current literature in several ways. 
The methodology mirrors that of previous research, but instead of subjectively categorising 
strategies, we statistically examine how different strategies covary. This should give a more 
accurate insight into psychological (rather than purely semantic) interrelationships between 
strategies than content analysis. Also, previous strategies research has been criticised over the 
possible effect on the content of self-reports of the instructions regarding what aspects of 
strategies to report (Strömwall & Willen, 2011). The current study attempts to minimise the 
influence of instructions on self-reports of strategy use by examining everything participants 
report thinking and feeling when lying, not just reports of strategies. 
Although this study is largely exploratory in nature, we have several hypotheses as to 
the nature of the results. First, we hypothesise that strategy use will be multidimensional in 
nature. Behavior control is often operationalized in the literature as a single factor 
representing decreases in behavior, and, because very few strategies are necessarily mutually 
exclusive, it is indeed possible that it is a unidimensional construct (e.g., a global factor of 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   6 
likely that behavior control is multi-dimensional in nature. Second, we hypothesise that the 
actual structure of deception strategies is not as complex as the categorisations produced in 
previous deception strategy research (strategies studies commonly induce over 10 strategy 
categories). The content of the different strategy categories reported in the literature is often 
conceptually related, so it is likely that a small number of broad strategy dimensions underpin 
strategy use. Third, in line with previous research on deception strategies, we hypothesise that 
the content of the main dimensions of strategy use will reflect two main forms of regulation: 
purposeful control of nonverbal cues and regulation and manipulation of speech content to 
produce plausible lies (Hartwig et al., 2010; Strömwall & Willen, 2011). 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 209 undergraduate students (71 males) who volunteered to 
participate for either £5 or course credit. Their average age was 20.4 years (SD = 2.59). 
Materials 
Post-session ‘deception phenomenology’ questionnaire. A questionnaire was 
created to measure participants’ experiences when lying. The items in this questionnaire were 
extracted from the written responses of 81 participants in two previous deception experiments 
to the post-session request: 'Please write at least a paragraph about what was going on in your 
mind when you were lying.' These two previous experiments involved participants 
undertaking a small number of lab-based activities before lying to an interviewer and 
claiming that they had in fact taken part in several other activities as well. We asked 
participants to write down everything that went on in their minds when they were lying. A 
broad request such as this should be expected to mitigate the concerns raised previously that 
the exact instructions given in previous strategy research appear to encourage participants to 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   7 
list of items was compiled into a deception phenomenology questionnaire. All items 
generated by participants in the pilot were used in the questionnaire after repetitions and 
ambiguous items were removed and after some items were altered to become grammatical, 
leaving 102 items for use in the experiment.  Participants were instructed to 'rate how 
frequently you experienced the following mental phenomena when lying during the interview', 
with each item rated on 5-point scale from Never (1) to Very Frequently (5). 
Procedure 
On giving informed consent, participants were taken to a table in a nearby room 
where they were presented with a collection of props that would allow them to take part in 
four different activities. The activities were: i) a bird identification activity in which 
participants were given a photograph of a North American bird (randomly chosen from a 
pool of 150 photographs) and asked to use a bird identification field guide to identify the bird 
to species level; ii) a paper plane making activity requiring participants to make a simple 
paper plane by following an instructional, laptop-based video clip; iii) a picture drawing 
activity requiring participants to spend two minutes drawing a picture about a set topic 
randomly chosen from a pool of 100 topics; and, iv) a video activity that comprised watching 
a short YouTube video clip on a laptop randomly chosen from a pool of 100. These activities 
were picked to capture a reasonably broad spectrum of passive and active everyday solitary 
activities of varying emotional content. 
Participants were told that they should undertake just two out of these four activities, 
as dictated by their instruction sheet. The assignment of activities varied randomly both 
across participants and between veracity conditions. They were told that, on completing the 
tasks, they would go to another room to be interviewed about their experiences. At interview, 
they were required to tell the interviewer the truth about the two activities they completed 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   8 
thus told two lies and two truths. The interviewer asked each participant five questions. The 
first question about each activity was a general one (“Tell me everything you remember 
doing during the activity”) and the remaining four, more specific questions were asked in 
random order. The four specific questions varied according to the activity. The interviewer 
was blind to whether the participant was lying or telling the truth, but knew that the 
participant would tell two lies and two truths. At the end of the session, participants 
completed the post-session questionnaire. 
Results 
Structure of Deception Phenomenology 
Participants’ questionnaire responses were submitted to a factor analysis to draw out the 
dimensions that underpin their experiences of lying. Although factor analysis is usually 
regarded as requiring large sample sizes in order to produce reliable results, claims regarding 
requisite sample sizes vary markedly and are often based on little other than the personal 
experience of the proponent (MacCallum et al., 2001; MacCallum et al., 1999). The few 
empirical studies that have investigated the effect of sample size on factor recovery suggest 
that there is no absolute sample size or item to participant ratio that is sufficient to recover a 
set of population factors (de Winter et al., 2009; MacCallum et al., 1999; 2001; Mundfrom et 
al., 2005). This empirical research suggests that the most important factor influencing the 
accurate recovery of population factors is the ratio of variables to factors. If each factor is 
defined by at least 6 or 7 highly loading items, then the factor solution is almost always 
robust, even with sample sizes of less than 100-200 (MacCallum et al., 2001). This remains 
the case even with low communalities (MacCallum et al., 1999; Mundfrom et al., 2005). 
Because the content of the different strategy categories reported in the literature is often 
conceptually related, we anticipated that the questionnaire items would be split between a 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   9 
enough to be recovered with a sample size of 209. 
To assess whether or not the data were suitable for this approach, Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was performed on the correlation matrix formed by the phenomenology data and 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was calculated. Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was significant, χ2(5151) = 13103.02, p < .001, and Kaiser’s measure of 
sampling adequacy was 0.78 (values of 0.5 or above generally being held to be suitable for 
factor analysis; Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Both tests therefore suggested 
that, in line with our first hypothesis, the data were dimensional in nature and suitable for 
factor analysis.  
To investigate the main dimensions of experiences during deception, an Unweighted 
Least Squares (ULS) factor analysis was performed with Oblimin rotation. A polychoric 
correlation matrix was analysed because the data were ordinal in nature, and Pearson 
correlations have been found to underestimate the strength of relationships between ordinal 
variables (Olsson, 1979). We used an Oblimin rotation, a form of oblique rotation, because 
there was no theoretical reason to assume that the factors would be uncorrelated. 
To inform the decision as to how many factors to extract, we conducted three 
statistical analyses. A parallel analysis (Timmerman & Lorenzo-Seva, 2011) suggested that 7 
factors should be extracted. However, when applied to datasets with sample sizes well over 
100 and large item to factor ratios, parallel analysis often errs towards the over-extraction of 
factors (Lorenzo-Seva et al., 2011). Two alternative statistical methods for selecting the 
number of common factors, reported to be more reliable under these conditions, are the Hull 
method (Lorenzo-Seva et al., 2011) and the Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test (Velicer, 
1976). The Hull method seeks to identify the number of factors which represents the best 
balance between goodness-of-fit and the degrees of freedom. This method suggested a two-


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   10 
Additionally, a subjective examination of eigenvalues suggested that a four-factor solution 
was appropriate (the first nine eigenvalues were 15.22, 14.03, 6.12, 4.27, 2.99, 2.77, 2.48, 
2.31, and 2.12 respectively). 
We then undertook a subjective examination of the factor loadings. Specifically, an 
examination of factor loadings in 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 factor solutions suggested a four-factor 
solution was most appropriate. The two-factor solution comprised an emotional-cognitive 
difficulty factor and a very broad behavior control factor. When 3 factors were extracted, the 
behavior control factor split into two readily interpretable factors, one pertaining to nonverbal 
behavior control, the other pertaining to attempts to create convincing lie content. The 
extraction of a four-factor solution produced an additional factor with high loadings from 
items pertaining to cognitive difficulty. No further psychologically and psychometrically 
valid factors were produced by extracting larger factor solutions. The extraction of a five-
factor solution produced an additional factor which appeared only to represent a ‘bloated 
specific’ (Cattell & Tsujioka, 1964) – that is, a factor composed mainly of similarly-worded 
items. The items pertained to difficulty maintaining eye contact (e.g. “I found it difficult to 
keep eye contact”, “I was conscious of the fact I kept losing eye contact”, “I could not look at 
the person I was lying to”, “I tried to avoid looking at the person I was lying to”). A six-
factor solution produced an additional bloated specific with high loading items pertaining to 
the linking of deceptive narratives to previous experiences (e.g. “I attempted to link my lie to 
things I had experienced before”, “I linked the content of my lie to my own real life 
experiences in order to make it more believable”, “I drew on my previous experiences in real 
life when constructing my lie”). Finally, the additional factor produced by a seven-factor 
solution was very small and had no large factor loadings (i.e. loadings above 0.5). 
Consequently, and in line with our second hypothesis that the structure of deception strategy 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   11 
adopted, which accounted for 38.9% of the variance in the correlation matrix. 
Table 1 presents the item loadings from the four-factor model. To aid interpretation, 
only item loadings of 0.4 or higher are displayed. 
[Table 1 near here] 
Factor 1, Cognitive difficulty, represents the cognitive difficulty experienced by 
participants when producing their lies (e.g., 'My mind wandered, resulting in uneasy pauses' 
and 'I found it hard to keep the content of my lie consistent') and behavioral efforts to 
minimise the impact of this difficulty (e.g., 'I tried to say that I could not remember specific 
details' and 'I plead ignorance to ease the pressure of having to make up a lie'). 
Factor 2, Nonverbal behavior control, represents deliberate attempts by participants to 
monitor and control their nonverbal behavior when lying. Nonverbal behavior control is a 
relatively low-level strategy involving the moderation of specific behaviors such as eye 
contact (i.e., ‘I tried to maintain eye contact with the person I was lying to’), speed of speech 
(i.e., ‘I was consciously trying to control the speed of my speech’) and tone of voice (i.e., ‘I 
tried to keep a monotone voice’). Frequently, this attempted moderation takes the form of 
suppressing behaviors, such as body movements, fast rate of speech and other nervous 
behaviors, which many laypeople assume are cues to deception (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). 
Also, central to this factor are attempts to maintain consistency in behavior between truths 
and lies (e.g. ‘I tried to keep my body language consistent between my truths and lies.’). 
Factor 3, Anxiety, relates to one of the unintended phenomenological consequences of 
lying, namely the experience of negative emotion (e.g., ‘I found lying scary’ and 'I felt 
anxious'). Only items related to negative emotion loaded on this factor: no items which 
obviously described the positive emotions associated with duping delight were associated 
with this dimension. Additionally, this factor contained several items related to the level of 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   12 
extracted, Anxiety does not appear to be strategic in nature. 
Factor 4, Detail, reflects strategic attempts to appear truthful by increasing the amount 
of detail, humour and emotion contained in one’s responses. Central to this dimension is the 
high-level deception strategy of drawing on previous, real-life experiences to make the 
content of lies sound more authentic (e.g., ‘I linked the content of my lie to my own real-life 
experiences in order to make it more believable’). Participants scoring highly on this 
dimension also tended to report attempting to directly control verbal behaviors by, for 
example, making their lies detailed (e.g., ‘I made my lies seem natural by adding detail’), 
adding extra emotion into their accounts (e.g., ‘I tried to make my lie sound natural by adding 
emotion’) and utilising humour (e.g., ‘I tried to be humorous in order to distract the person I 
was lying to from paying attention to my body language’). 
[Table 2 near here] 
There were moderate correlations among the four identified factors. Table 2 presents 
an inter-factor correlation matrix. The largest correlations were between Cognitive difficulty 
and Anxiety and between Detail and Nonverbal behavior control. 
Discussion 
Using a bottom-up approach, the current study derived three factors of deception 
strategy use in a lab-based deception task. In doing so the study clarified the superordinate 
factor structure that organises the numerous deception strategies that have been reported in 
the literature. As hypothesised, strategy use was multidimensional and defined by a small 
number of broad factors: a factor analysis of participants’ scores on a post-session deception 
phenomenology questionnaire recovered four phenomenology factors, three of which 
represented deception strategies. 
Deception strategy use was multidimensional, being defined by three large factors. As 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   13 
and manipulation of speech content to produce plausible lies. Indeed, one factor essentially 
represented the control of nonverbal cues and another the manipulation of speech content. 
The factors that emerged from our analysis also fit well with the broader deception research 
literature. For example, the Cognitive difficulty factor maps on to the construct of cognitive 
load, which has occupied a central position in deception theory for several decades (Greene et 
al., 1985; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Vrij et al., 2008; Zuckerman et al., 
1981). Although the factor was defined mainly by items pertaining to the experience of 
cognitive load, it was also defined by items describing deliberate efforts to account for such 
difficulties. The strategic element was relatively small and focussed on attempts to say as 
little as possible, for example by claiming a lapse of memory. 
Similarly, the Nonverbal behavior control factor reported here fits well with the 
modern conception of behavior control in the research literature (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 
2007; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Behavior control is generally considered to focus on attempts 
to suppress the increases in behaviors thought by most people to index deception. In the 
present study, the factor was defined by items such as 'I tried to control any nervous actions', 
'I tried to keep still', and 'I tried maintain eye contact with the person I was lying to'.  The 
emergence of this factor in the present research mirrors the results of previous deception 
strategy research (Hartwig et al., 2007; Masip, 2013; Strömwall et al., 2006; Strömwall & 
Willen, 2011) and supports the central position of this type of behavior control strategy in 
deception theory. 
Perhaps the most interesting factor to emerge from the study was the strategy 
dimension, ‘Detail’. The emergence of this factor is in line with several previous studies 
which have reported that producing detailed lies is one of the main deception strategies 
reported by lairs (Hartwig et al., 2007; Strömwall et al., 2006; Strömwall & Willen, 2011). 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   14 
in nature, focussing on the fluent and confident delivery of a detailed deceptive message. 
Second, whereas some of the content of the Nonverbal behavior control factor related to 
attempts to suppress behavior, many of the items with high loadings on the Detail factor 
pertained to attempts to increase behavior, in the form of adding extra details to deceptive 
messages. 
Another important difference between these two behavior control dimensions was the 
latter’s mix of both strategies that directly control behavior and indirectly control behavior. 
Whereas all the items loading highly on the Nonverbal behavior control factor described 
direct attempts to control specific behaviors such as gaze, facial expression and speed of 
speech, the Detail factor was defined by several items pertaining to the strategy of indirectly 
influencing behavior by utilising previous experiences in the construction of lies. The 
importance of this strategy has been highlighted by recent research. In a study on self-
reported deception strategies, Leins et al. (2013) found that reporting previous experiences 
was the most widespread deception strategy used by participants. The results of the present 
research provide further support for the importance of this strategy. Another, similar strategy 
contained within the Detail factor was self-deception. Participants attempted to make their 
lies more naturalistic by convincing themselves that what they were lying about was actually 
true. This finding is in line with modern theories of self-deception, which suggest that one of 
the reasons self-deception evolved was to produce more convincing lies in the face of ever 
more proficient human lie detectors (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). The Detail factor 
represents a type of behavior control strategy that has been relatively neglected in the 
deception literature and should be the focus of further research attention. 
Interestingly, the latter two strategy factors were correlated. People who attempted to 
control their nonverbal behavior also tended to try to add detail and expressiveness to their 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   15 
reduced correlation matrix suggested that a two-factor solution might best represent the 
structure of the data, with one of the factors representing a general 'behavior control' factor. 
However, there is a significant pragmatic benefit to adopting a multidimensional rather than 
unidimensional representation of deception strategies. The different strategy factors might be 
expected to have very different effects on nonverbal cues to deception: adding extra details 
should result in an increase in nonverbal behavior, for example through increased gesture 
production, whereas increased nonverbal behavior control should result in a decrease in 
nonverbal behavior. Consequently, the content of a single strategy superfactor would be 
heterogeneous in terms of the effects it has on cues to deception, making it of limited value in 
an applied context. 
The fourth factor, Anxiety, was not strategic in nature. It represented the negative 
emotions experienced when lying. Furthermore, the pattern of correlations between this 
factor and the strategy factors suggests that anxiety does not strongly impact on strategic 
behavior when deceiving. Its emergence is almost certainly a result of the breadth of request 
given to the participants who generated the questionnaire items: they were asked to report all 
aspects of deception phenomenology, not just strategies. However, the emergence of this 
factor should be of interest to deception researchers. The positive correlation between the 
Anxiety and Cognitive Difficulty factors serves as a reminder that these two phenomena co-
occur in a deception context. Anxiety directs cognitive resources away from executive 
processes and towards the perception of threatening stimuli (McNaughton & Corr, 2008; 
Vytal et al., 2012). In the context of deception, increased anxiety when lying would be 
expected to reduce the cognitive resources that participants are able to direct towards the task 
of creating a lie. Conversely, it is also feasible that experiencing cognitive difficulty when 
creating lies could have been a source of anxiety for liars, further strengthening the 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   16 
The results of the present study may help inform attempts to improve deception 
detection performance in at least three ways. First, the efficacy of veracity judgments based 
on clusters of cues may be a function of how well those cues cover the four different 
experience dimensions reported by participants. When the coverage is reduced to one or two 
of the identified dimensions then we would predict lower accuracy in veracity judgements 
than when all four dimensions were represented. 
Second, the factors identified in this study suggest different ways in which interview 
tactics can make lying more difficult. To date, most research has focused on developing 
methods for increasing cognitive difficulty, yet the explication of the different dimensions 
suggests other foci may be possible. For example, it might be possible to increase the 
magnitude of cues to deception stemming from the nonverbal behavior control strategy by 
increasing the salience of the extent to which liars have their body movements observed. 
Such a perceived increase in scrutiny should, providing there is differential use of the strategy 
between liars and truthtellers, amplify cues to deception arising from the controlled 
suppression of body movements. 
Third, the factors reported in the current study might help to improve deception 
detection by defining new individual differences variables for investigation in the context of 
deception. Indeed, compared with personality traits, the factors reported here would be 
expected to have a direct influence on the production of cues to deception, so an argument 
can be made that this is the best level at which to understand and investigate individual 
differences in deception cues. To further investigate the suitability of the four factors as 
individual differences variables, future research should examine the stability of liars' standing 
on the factors across deceptive situations. 
Several limitations of the present research are worth noting. First, it is worth 


































































DECEPTION STRATEGIES   17 
to accurately self-report on their behaviors (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, self-reports are almost certainly a more valid way of 
measuring explicit deception strategies than behavioral observation. It would be difficult to 
imagine how a researcher could accurately infer the use of a strategy such as ‘I imagined 
myself actually experiencing what I was lying about’ or ‘I attempted to link my lies to things 
I had experienced before’ by objectively measuring behavior. Consequently, self-report 
methodology forms the backbone of modern research on deception strategies (e.g. Clemens et 
al., 2013; Colwell et al., 2006; Hartwig et al., 2007; Liens et al., 2013; Masip, 2013; 
Strömwall et al., 2006; Strömwall & Willen, 2011; Vrij et al., 2010). Even one of the most 
famous critiques of the self-report method suggests that the data produced from self-reports 
are more valid than information from external observations when it comes to ‘emotions, 
evaluations, and plans’ (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 255). Indeed, in the context of deception 
strategies, previous reports of significant correlations between self-reports of behavior control 
and behavior when lying (Vrij et al, 1996) suggest that self-reports of deception strategies 
possess at least some validity. It remains possible though that parallel, unconscious strategies 
are at play in deceivers’ minds which are unavailable to introspection, and so not directly 
measurable by self-report. 
Second, it remains unclear whether the factors reported will generalize across 
different types of lie, including those in applied forensic contexts, where lies would be 
expected to be more self-motivated and include denials of having done something. Such lies 
stand in contrast to those produced in the present study, where liars simply claimed to have 
done something that they had not. This is an empirical question and future research should 
investigate the replicability of the deception factors across different types of lie. However, the 
factors are relatively broad in terms of content and are consequently of relevance to many 
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across deception contexts. Furthermore, research on offenders’ self-reported deception 
strategies suggests that the strategies used by prisoners in interrogations overlap significantly 
with those of students taking part in lab-based deception studies (Strömwall & Willen, 2011). 
However, it is obvious that a different set of factors will underpin lies perpetrated in other 
modalities, for example in online communication, where nonverbal behavior is often 
irrelevant. Future research should establish how stable the three strategy factors reported here 
are across deception type, context and modality. 
Third, the present research examined only deception strategies; it did not investigate 
the strategies employed by truth tellers. It is possible that one or more of the three broad 
deception strategy factors reported here also represents one of the main factors organising the 
strategies of truth-tellers during interviews. Future research should investigate whether such a 
potential overlap exists between liars’ and truth-tellers’ strategy factors. Cues to deception 
would be expected to be most pronounced when they relate to factors where there is no 
counterpart in truth-tellers. However, it should be noted that even an overlap between truth-
tellers’ and liars’ strategies could produce cues to deception if liars’ behavior is affected by 
that strategy factor more (or less) strongly than truthtellers’. 
Fourth, most factor analyses account for a greater percentage of variance in the data 
than the factor analysis conducted as part of the present research. The four factors extracted 
accounted for 38.9% of the variance in scores on the deception phenomenology 
questionnaire. In a meta-analysis of the amount of variance accounted for in factor analysis, 
Peterson (2000) reported that factor analyses with 31 or more items on average accounted for 
48.1% of the variance in the correlation matrix. In contrast to most factor analyses, our data 
were not pre-structured to increase the value of the loadings on the resultant factors, and, by 
extension, increase the amount of variance accounted for by the factor solution. Moreover, 
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the number of items in a factor analysis, the less variance any given number of factors will 
account for (Peterson, 2000). For both of these statistical reasons, it should be expected that 
the present factor analysis would produce a solution which accounts for less variance than 
most. 
Conclusion 
Using a data-driven, factor analytic approach, this study reported three broad factors 
representing the main strategies participants used when lying. One factor, pertaining to 
strategic attempts to control nonverbal behavior, mapped onto the way behavior control is 
usually conceptualized in the deception literature. A second factor mapped onto the construct 
of cognitive load, representing the cognitive difficulty experienced when lying and the 
strategic behaviors produced to cope with it. A third factor, defined by attempts to increase 
the detail, emotion and humour in lies, was particularly noteworthy and represents a construct 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings of the Questionnaire Items on Four Factors 
 Questionnaire factor 






I tried to plead ignorance to ease the pressure of 
having to make up a lie 
0.58    
I was consciously trying to control the speed of my 
speech 
0.53 0.42   
I tried to make what I was saying as realistic as 
possible 
-0.51    
I said things during my lie which were designed to 
avoid further questions being asked 
0.50    
I tried to say that I could not remember specific 
details 
0.49    
I tried to keep a monotone voice 0.48    
My mind wandered, resulting in uneasy pauses 0.48    
I found it hard to keep the content of my lie 
consistent 
0.48    
I felt confused 0.44  0.42  
I tried to answer as fluently as possible -0.43    
I tried not to smile or laugh when lying 0.42    
I believed what I was saying even though I knew it 
was a lie 
0.42    
I could feel my body shaking 0.41    
I tried to keep my body position the same as it was 
when I was being honest 
 0.72   
I thought about the amount of eye contact I was 
making with the person I was lying to 
 0.67   
I tried not to change anything I was doing physically 
from when I was telling the truth 
 0.67   
I tried to match the style of my lies to the style of 
my truthful utterances 
 0.64   
I attempted to communicate information in the same 
manner when lying as when telling the truth 
 0.63   
I was conscious of my body language  0.63   
I tried to talk at a steady speed  0.62   
I tried to maintain eye contact with the person I was 
lying to 
 0.61   
I tried to control any 'nervous' actions  0.61   
I tried to be calm  0.59   
I tried to avoid using any body language that would 
indicate that I was lying 
 0.55   
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the truth 
I tried not to look particularly nervous  0.53   
I tried to keep my body language consistent between 
my lies and truths 
 0.51   
I tried to look calm  0.48   
I tried to make sure that I didn't contradict myself  0.48   
I tried to keep still  0.45   
I tried to bear in mind the signs that people give off 
when lying 
 0.45   
I kept my body movements to a minimum  0.45   
I tried to match the length of my deceptive 
responses to the length of my truthful ones 
 0.43   
I tried to control the direction my eyes were looking  0.42   
I tried to remain as natural as possible  0.41   
I was so focused on what I was saying, I lost track 
of my body movements 
 -0.4   
I thought it was obvious I was lying   0.83  
I felt the person I was lying to would be able to tell I 
was lying 
  0.82  
I felt unconvincing   0.78  
I was nervous about how obvious my lie was   0.76  
I was anxious because I wasn't confident about the 
content of my lie 
  0.74  
I felt anxious   0.74  
I worried I would be found out   0.7  
I found lying scary   0.69  
I did not feel any different when lying as compared 
to telling the truth 
  -0.65  
I felt that my hesitations gave me away   0.61  
I found it hard to think quickly   0.61  
I did not like lying   0.6  
I stumbled with what I was saying   0.6  
I found it hard to invent the details of my lie   0.57  
I hoped I wouldn't be questioned any further   0.56  
I found it difficult to keep eye contact   0.56  
The more I tried to elaborate on my lie the more I 
felt it was obvious I was lying 
  0.55  
My heartbeat increased   0.55  
I was aware that the detail in my lie was poor 
compared to the detail in my truthful statements 
  0.54  
I was conscious of the fact that I kept hesitating   0.53  
I felt guilty   0.52  
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My speech became faster   0.46  
I could not look at the person I was lying to   0.46  
I made relatively long pauses because I had to create 
a lie 
  0.44  
I found it difficult to keep track of my body 
movements when lying 
  0.41  
I found it hard to picture my lie in my head   0.41  
I tried to make my lie sound natural by adding 
emotion 
   0.67 
I imagined myself actually experiencing what I was 
lying about 
   0.62 
I attempted to link my lie to things I had 
experienced before 
   0.62 
I linked the content of my lie to my own real life 
experiences in order to make it more believable 
   0.62 
I drew on my previous experiences in real life when 
constructing my lie 
   0.59 
As my lie progressed I became more creative    0.57 
I tried to be humorous in order to distract the person 
I was lying to from paying attention to my body 
language 
   0.56 
I tried to be expressive    0.55 
I tried to make up extra little details to make my lie 
more convincing 
   0.54 
I tried to decorate my story with a few irrelevancies    0.52 
I tried to imagine that the thing I was lying about 
was actually true 
   0.52 
I made my lies seem natural by adding detail    0.47 
I tried to think that I was telling a story rather than 
lying 
   0.46 
I tried to give as much detail as possible in order to 
sound convincing 
   0.46 
I repeated elements of my lie in an attempt to make 
my lie more realistic 
   0.46 
I tried to think of details which would make my lie 
believable 
   0.44 
I tried to think up answers as quickly as I could in 
order to sound convincing 
   0.41 
I attempted to appear confident so that I would come 
across as believable 
   0.4 
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Table 2 
Inter-factor Correlation Matrix. 
Factors 1 2 3 4 
1. Cognitive Difficulty -    
2. Nonverbal Behavior Control -0.02 -   
3. Anxiety 0.25 0.03 -  
4. Detail -0.15 0.3 0.01 - 
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